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1. INTRODUCTION
The forward exchange rate is surely the jack-of-all-trades of international
financial economics. Whenever researchers need a variablerepresenting inves-
tor expectations of future spot rates, the forward rate is the first tocome to
mind. On the other hand, the forward rate is frequently used tomeasure the
empirically elusive foreign exchange risk premium.
These two conflicting roles are most evident in the large literaturetesting
whether the forward discount is an unbiased predictor of the futurechange in
the spot exchange rate.1 Most of the studies that test the unbiasedness
We would like to thank Greg Connor and Toe Mattey for helpful comments, Barbara Bruer,
John Calverley, Louise Cordova, Kathryn Dominguez, Laura Knoy, Stephen Marris, and Phil
Young for help in obtaining data, the National Science Foundation (under grant no. SES-
8218300),theInstitute for Business and Economic Research at U. C. Berkeley, and the
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation's doctoral dissertation program for researchsupport. 1Referencesinclude Tryon (19'?9), Lev-ich (1979), Bilsori (1981a), Longworth (1981)
Hsieh (1982), Fama (1984), Huang (1984), Park (1984) and Hodrick and Srivastava (1986).
For a recent survey of the literature and additional citations see Boothe andLongworth (1988).-2-
hypothesis reject it, and they generally agree on the direction of bias. They
tend to disagree, however, about whether the bias is evidence of a risk premium
or of a violation of rational expectations. For example, studies by Longworth
(1981) and Bilson (1981a) assume that investors are risk neutral, so that the
systematic component of exchange rate changes in excess of the forward
discount is interpreted as evidence of a failure of rational expectations. On the
other hand, Hsieh (1984) and most others attribute the same systematic com-
ponent to a time-varying risk premium that separates the forward discount
from expected depreciation.
Investigations by Fama (1984) and Hodrick and Srivastava (1986) have
recently gone a step further, interpreting the bias not only as evidence of a risk
premium1 but also as evidence that the variance of the risk premium is greater
than the variance of expected depreciation. Bilson (1985) terms this view a new
"empirical paradigm" because it incorporates an essentially static model of
exchange rate expectations; changes in the forward discount predominantly
reflect changes in the risk premium rather than changes in expected deprecia-
tion. Often cited in support of this view is the work of Meese and RogofT (1983),
who find that a random walk model consistently forecasts future spot rates
better than alternative models, including the forward rate.
But one cannot address without additional information the basic issues of
whether systematic expectational errors or the risk premium are alone respon-
sible for the repeatedly biased forecasts of the forward discount (or whether it
is some combination of the two), let alone whether the risk premium is more
variable than expected depreciation. In this paper we use survey data on
exchange rate expectations in an attempt to help resolve these issues. The sur-
veys allow us to divide the forward discount into its two components -expected
depreciation and the risk premium --andto inspect separately the properties-3-
of each.
Though surveys of agents' expectations may in general be less desirable
than data on agents' actual market behavior, in this case the merit ofa new
data source lies in what could not have been learned without it. One particular
advantage of the surveys is that our estimates of the risk premium do not
depend on the validity of any specific model or assumptions. As a consequence
we can test directly whether investors regard assets denominated in difTerent
currencies as perfect substitutes. A second advantage is that, with the issue of
the risk premium's existence tentatively resolved, we can then test the
hypothesis of forward rate unbiasedness and come away with a clear idea of
how much bias is due to the risk premium and how much is due tosystematic
expeetational errors. A third advantage of the surveys (which cover a variety of
sample periods and forecast horizons) is that they can help us gain a sense for
the accuracy of earlier interpretations given to the large number of rejections
of the forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some simple descrip-
tive statistics from the survey data. Here the focus is primarily on the uncondi-
tional prediction errors of the forward discount. In section 3, we perform the
standard (conditional) test of forward discount unbiasedness, and use the sur-
veys to decompose the bias into a component attributable to systematic expec-
tational errors and a component attributable to the risk premium. In section 4,
we test formally whether the risk premium component is significantly different
from zero, that is, we test whether investors regard positions in different
currencies as perfect substitutes. In section 5, we test formally whether the
expectational errors component is significantly different from zero, that is, we
ask if the survey expectations are rational in the sense that they are formed in
a manner consistent with the true spot process. Finally. section 6 offers our-4-
conclusions.
2.DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Our exchange rate expectations data come from three independent sur-
veys. The first survey source is Money Market Services (MMS), Inc. Every two
weeks from January 1983 to October 1984, MMS spoke by phone with an average
of 30 currency traders or currency-room economists at major international
banks. Respondents were asked for their expectations of the value of the
pound, mark, Swiss franc and yen against the dollar in two weeks and three
months time. From October 1984 to February 1986, MMS conducted its survey
every week, asking for expectations one week and one month into the future.
The Economist Financial Report has conducted telephone interviews with
currency traders at 14 leading international banks one day each six weeks
beginning in June, 1981. On each occasion, respondents reported their expec-
tations of the value of the pound. French franc, mark, Swiss franc and yen at
three-, six- and twelve-month horizons. Finally, the Amex Bank Review (Amex)
surveys 250-300 central and private bankers, corporate treasurers and finance
directors, and economists, and records their expectations of the value of the
pound, French franc, mark, Swiss franc and yen against the dollar at six-month
and twelve-month horizons. Most of these data sets are discussed and analyzed
in Frankel and Froot (1986).2
Naturally, the benefits that survey data provide do not come without possi-
ble costs. The presence of heterogeneous beliefs, the use of the median
response, the lack of perfect synchronization, and the sheer volatility of the
spot rate all make some measurement error in the survey data likely. We
present results in section 4 which suggest that the surveys are surprisingly
2Anotherpaper that uses the MMS data is Dominguez (1988).-5-
"clean". Nevertheless, we try to use only tests that are robust to thepresence
of random measurement error in the data.3 In order to takeadvantage of the
complete sample of data available (the three sources contain over 1.450 data
points), we used every available opportunity to raise our sample sizes. The data
are frequently pooled across currencies. We also employ a method-of--moments
estimation procedure which allows us to pooi the data across different forecast
horizons.
2.1. Decomposition of ForwardRatePrediction Errors
The simplest test for whether the forward discount is an unbiasedpredic-
tor of the future spot rate is a test for unconditional bias in the forwardrate
prediction errors. These errors are defined as:
—As÷ = (f4— ,s'÷)+(s'— tst +) + (i)
where fd is the forward discount (the log of the current forward rateminus
the log of the current spot rate, f —s)expressed in terms of domestic
currency, and and S+karethe log of the actual spot rate and expected
spot rate k periods into the future, respectively, minus the log of the current
spot rate. Equation (1) thus defines the risk premium, rp, as the expected
excess return required by investors in order to hold an open position in domes-
tic currency at time t and as the expectational prediction error, realized
at time t+k. If exchange rate risk is completely diversifiable andexpectations
are rational, then the forward rate prediction errors should be purely random.4
Also, weexperimented with different approximations to the precise survey and forecast
dates of the Amex survey, which was conducted by mail over a period ofup to a month. We
used the average of the 30 days during the survey and also the mid-point of thesurvey
period to construct reference sets. Both gave very similar results, so that only results from
the former sample were reported.
Under perfect substitutability, expected real, and not nominal, profits should bezero;
the two differ because of Jensen's inequality (see Engel, 1984). We do notincorporate the
effects of purchasing power uncertainty in this paper, however. One mightexpect the
effects are sma]l the standard deviation of unexpected changes in the inflation rateare
about 1/30 the size of the standard deviation in exchange rate changes (Litterman, 1980,
and the results in Tables 1, 2 and 3 of this paper).-6-
Table 1 reports the time series means of the forward discount, ex post
change in the spot rate and the forward rate prediction error in equation (1),
sampled on the days when surveys were conducted.5 In several cases (particu-
larly the MMS three-month data and the Economist and Amex twelve-month
data), we can reject the hypothesis that the forward rate is on average an
unbiased predictor of the future spot rate.6 The signs of the errors are clearly
sensitive to the sample period; they are negative in the later MMS sample
(October 1984 to February 1986) and in the Amex data from the late 1970s, but
positive in between. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 show that such variation is
due to substantial swings in average ex post exchange rate changes from sam-
ple period to sample period and not due to swings in the forward discount.
Without any additional information on investors' expected future spot rate,
one would have to assume that the risk premium is zero in order to inter-
pret equation (1) as a test of market efficiency. Alternatively, if one wishes to
interpret equation (1) as a test for the existence of a risk premium, the
assumption of rational expectations is required (i.e., ?7÷k is serially uncorre-
ft ft latedand F? (flg÷ftITg)= 0). Thus the results in Table 1 could be interpreted
as evidence that investors made repeated forecasting mistakes during some the
survey periods, .g that investors distinguished between assets denominated in
different currencies on the basis of risk (or else some combination of these
polar points of view).7
bDElprovided us with daily forward and spot exchange rates, computed as the average
of the noon-time bid and ask rates.
6TheEconomist surveys, MMS one-month and three-month surveys, and the Amex
twelve-month survey were conducted at intervals shorter than their respective forecast
horizons. This implies that the prediction errors of the forward discount and of the survey
expectations, in Tables 1 and 2 respectively, are not all independent, even under the hy-
pothesis of rational expectations. For the Economist and MMS data, the standard deviation
of the means were estimated by a method of moments procedure discussed in the following
section. For the Amex data, confidence intervals were constructed assuming that the
number of degrees of freedom is equal to the number of nonoverlapping observations. This
latter procedure implies that t-tests reported for the Amex data are lower bounds.
7Otherpotential candidates to explain the non-zero forward rate prediction errors are
the so-called "peso problem" (but see Frankel, 1985) and the convexity term due to






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Table 2 we use the survey data to separate the forward rate prediction
errors into the two terms on the right-hand-side of equation (1): the risk prem-
ium and expectational errors. Here the conclusions concerning the nature of
each are surprisingly very different from those one might draw from Table 1.
Note first that the means of the risk premia measured in the survey data are
large, averaging around an annualized 5 percent and reaching 9 percent in
several cases. Second, and perhaps even more striking, is that nothing about
the sign or magnitude of the risk premia as measured by the survey data can be
inferred from the forward discount prediction errors. In fact, the premia in
column (1) of Table 2 happen to be consistently opposite in sign from the for-
ward rate errors.6 Third, the risk prernia often appear negatively correlated
with the forward rate errors, not just across data sets, but within each data set
as well. The first column of Table 3 reports correlation coefficients for each
currency and survey: 21 of the 33 estimates are less than zero. Charts 1
through 4 show the time series of the forward rate errors and the survey risk
prernia for each of the data sets.9 The graphs show how badly the forward pred-
iction errors have measured the premia in the past.
Such a poor correspondence might suggest instead that the survey data
are very imprecise measures of investors' true expectations. But, in the first
place, it should be noted that findings of unconditional bias are unaffected by
any measurement error in the survey data, provided the error is random. Posi-
tive and negative measurement errors should tend to cancel out, just as posi-
tive and negative prediction errors should tend to cancel out under the null
hypothesis. In the second place, we offer an explicit estimate of the magnitude
This is the same as saying that the survey prediction errors are of the same sign as the
forward rate errors, but have consistently larger absolute values.
°Graphs1-3 use moving averages across all of the currencies included in the designated







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of this measurement error component in section 4. In the third place, the
degree to which the surveys qualitatively corroborate one another is striking.
For example, the risk premium in the Economist data (Chart 1) is negative dur-
ing the entire sample, except for a short period from late 1984 until mid-1985.
The MMS three-month sample (Chart 2) reports that the risk premium did not
become positive until the last quarter of 1984, while MMS one-month data
(Chart 3) shows the risk premium then remained positive until mid-1985. That
the surveys agree on the nature and timing of major swings in the risk premium
is some evidence that the particularities of each group of respondents do not
influence the results.
We can test whether the data statistically reject the hypothesis that the
means of the forward rate prediction errors are attributable entirely to the risk
premia alone, assuming that the surveys measure expectations accurately. The
tests for the significance of the mean survey prediction errors in Table 2 show
that 27 out of 44 samples reject the hypothesis that the survey expectations
are unbiased predictors of the future spot rate. This is a rejection of the
equivalent hypothesis that the systematic component of the forward rate pred-
iction errors is attributable entirely to the risk premium. We can also test
whether the data statistically reject the hypothesis that the errors are attri-
butable entirely to the existence of expectational errors. Table 2 shows that we
can easily reject this hypothesis because the risk premium is significantly
different from zero and of the opposite sign.
The survey data therefore suggest that an interpretation of the uncondi-
tional bias in the forward rate prediction errors that imposes rational expecta-
tions would lead to consistently incorrect conclusions with respect to the sign
of the risk premium and the nature of its time-series variation. At the opposite
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dence of a failure of rational expectations, but then the forward rateerrors
would offer no evidence at all regarding the substantial risk premia recorded in
the survey data. Either interpretation, or any combination of the two, would
miss the fact that the survey risk premium lies in the direction opposite to that
indicated by the results in Table 1, that is, expectational errors are more than
100 percent responsible for the unconditional bias in the forward rate errors.
2.2. Variability of theRisk Premium andExchange Rate Expectations
Survey data can also be used to shed some Light on the relative volatility of
expected depreciation and the risk premium. The recent papers by Fama
(1984) and Hodrick and Srivastava (1986) argue that the risk premium is more
variable than expected depreciation or, in the extreme formulation of Bilson
(1965), that expected depreciation is zero. Table 3 shows the variance of
expected changes in the spot rate and the variance of the risk premia, for each
data set and broken down by currency. The magnitude of ex post exchange
rate changes (column (1)) dwarfs that of the forward discount (column (2)).10
For example, the reported variance of annualized spot rate changes of 2per-
cent represents a standard deviation of about 14 percent. By comparison, the
variance of expected depreciation is around .25 percent. a standard deviation
of 5 percent.
The variance of expected depreciation is comparable in size to the vari-
ance of the risk premium, and is larger in 36 of the 40 samples calculated in
Table 3. Thus "random walk" expectations are do not appear to be supported
by the survey data. We test formally the Fama (1984) hypothesis that the vari-
ance of expected depreciation is less than the variance of the risk premium in
section 4. Both are several times larger than the variance of the forward
10Thisempirical regularity has often been noted; e.g., Mussa (1979),Table 3
CUIPARIGON OF VARIAIICU OF EXPECTED DEPRECiATION
All TIE RISK PREIIIUII
ii percent per anna)

















TOTAL 181$ 10/84-2/Oh247 2.756 0.346
UK 62 3.809 0.429
HO 62 NA 2.506 NA 0.251 NA
SN 61 3.271 0.404
62 1.564 0.264
2 HOEKS
TOTAL 181$ 1183—10184 187 0.703 0.113
It 47 0.765 0.111
88 47 NA 0.886 NA 0.122 NA NA
SN 46 0.640 0.114
lA 47 0.533 0.084
inn
TOTAL 181$ 10/84—2186 116 2.131 2.285 0.008 0.258 0.240 0.018
It 44 4.226 2.372 2.839 0.002 0.359 0.358 0.001
ND 44 4.047 1.891 2.091 0.000 0.224 0.2*9 0.005
SN 44 4.060 2.349 2.595 0.001 0.228 0.224 0.004 U 44 0.076 1.997 1.696 0.001 0.129 0.137 4.008
3NOIITHS
TOTAL 181$ 1/83—10184 *87 0.657 0.610 0.014 0.067 0.062 0.005
It 41 0.100 0.712 0.647 0.004 0.036 0.034 0.002
ND 47 0.192 0.732 0.702 0.002 0.045 0.054 4.009
SI 46 0.095 0.481 0.447 0.002 0.118 0.116 0.002 U 47 0.028 0.506 0.470 0.004 0.036 0.048 4.012
TOTALECONONIST 6/81—12/85 190 1.683 1.651 0.051 0.178 0.121 0.056 It 38 4.327 1.596 1.433 0.014 0.188 0.142 0.046
FR 38 4.255 1.651 1.783 0.037 0.092 0.090 0.002
88 38 4.234 1.611 1.567 0.004 0.129 0.111 0.011
511 38 4.128 2.091 2.006 0.011 0.109 0.084 0.025
lA 38 0.093 1.576 1.440 0.020 0.198 0.149 0.049
6 MONTHS
TOTAL ECONWIIST6/81—12/85 190 2.016 2.004 0.093 0.173 0.082 0.091
UK 38 4.27! 1.803 1.554 0.02* 0.110 0.077 0.033
FR 38 4.255 2.085 2.251 0.050 0.097 0.072 0.025
ND 38 4.352 2.033 1.913 0.006 0.082 0.070 0.013
SN 38 4.265 2.512 2.345 0.016 0.087 0.070 0.011 U 38 4.096 2.050 1.798 0.033 0.101 0.053 0.048
TOTAL AMEX 1/16-8/85 51 1.773 1.658 0.111 0.134 0.084 0.051
It 12 4.065 1.704 1.395 0.074 0.131 0.035 0.096
FR 9 4.179 1.621 1.583 0.033 0.074 0.039 0.035
HO 12 4.265 1.528 1.341 0.025 0.150 0.094 0.056
SN 9 4.424 2.620 2.213 0.043 0.183 0.110 0.072
lA 9 4.223 2.123 1.679 0.056 0.095 0.028 0.067.
12 MONThS
TOTAL ECIIINNIIST6/81—12/85 195 1.293 1.368 0.155 0.215 0.092 0.123
It 38 0.444 2.773 1.319 0.027 0.132 0.113 0.019
FR 38 0.404 2.413 1.432 0.058 0.092 0.069 0.023
HO 38 0.198 2.161 1.088 0.008 0.071 0.057 0.014
SN 38 0.409 2.723 1.340 0.023 0.078 0.058 0.020 U 38 0.326 2.579 1.086 0.046 0.115 0.052 0.063
TOTAL AlEX 1/16-0/85 51 1.731 1.446 0.192 0.195 0.129 0.066
It 12 4.293 1.784 1.315 0.111 0.198 0.071 0.127
FR 9 4.251 1.211 1.180 0.055 0.040 0.020 0.020
88 12 4.181 0.988 0.768 0.039 0.228 0.164 0.064
SN 9 4.415 2.391 1.949 0.064 0.178 0.195 4.018 U 9 0.195 3.393 2.564 0.085 0.109 0.065 0.044
Notesa 3p is the correlation coeficient and farrepresents the forward
riteprediction error. For the siz—eonth and twelve—sooth Econosist and
twelve—sooth Ann datasets, cabins (11 and(2)contain 2, 1andI fewer
observations for each country, respectively, thanindicateduatdr coluan N.- 10-
discount.Thus the relative stability of the forward discount masksgreater
variability in its two components, corroborating Fama's finding that the risk
premium is negatively correlated with the expected change in the spot rate11
Table 3 also has implications for tests of serial correlation in the forward
rate errors, fcL— LSg4ft.Such tests have been performed by Hansen and
Hodrick (1980), Dooley and Shafer (1982) and others. Under theassumption of
rational expectations, any serially correlated component of the forward rate
errors would be evidence of a time-varying risk premium. However, the small
size of the variance of the risk premium compared to the variance of the for-
ward rate errors (reported in columns (2) and (6) of Table 3, respectively),
implies that even when the null hypothesis of no serial correlation fails because
of the risk premium such tests will have low power. Using theassumption of
rational expectations and equation (i), the autocorrelation coefficient of
—t+kconverges in probability to:
ftft ft
COV(Dpg ,rpg_ft) var(rp)
ft p — (i')
var(fdg —ESg÷) var(fd —ts-fk)
where p is the probability limit of the corresponding autocorrelation coefficient
of the risk premium. Table 3 suggests that ratio of the variance of the risk
premium to that of the forward rate errors on the righthand-side of equation
(1') has an upper bound of 0.1.12 Thus, even if the the risk premium followsa
random walk, so that p = 1, this ratio implies that the upper bound for thepor-
tion of the autocorrelation coefficient of the prediction errors attributable to
This correlation is, however, biased downward by any measurement error that might
be present in the surveys. If such error is purely random, theniie cnxariance ofexpected derecietjoijnd the risk premium may be written as cov(s,+ft,rpt) —var(÷k),where
3L+k and rpt are the "true" values of expected depreciation and of the risk premium,
respectively, and E+k is the measurement error component of the survey.
1 In the Economist data for example, the autocorrelation coefficient of thesurvey risk
premium p, is considerably less than one: for the three-, six- and twelve-month data sets p
equals .19, .23 and .08, respectively.- 11-
therisk premium is only 0.1.
3.USING THE SURVEY DATA IN THE FORWARD RATE UNBIASEDNE5S REGRESSION
In tests of forward market unbiasedness, attention has focusedon the
optimal weights placed on the forward rate versus the contemporaneous spot
rate in predicting the future spot rate. The equation most commonly used isa
regression of the future change in the spot rate on the forward discount:
kk =a ÷pfd+ tt+k (2)
where the null hypothesis is that the weight on the forward rate is one and the
constant term is zero, i.e., fi=1 and a = 0. In other words, the realized spot
rate is equal to the forward rate plus a purely random error term. A second but
equivalent specification is a regression of the forward rate prediction error on
the forward discount:
— =a1 + + tlt+k (2')
where a1 = —a and=1—fl.The null hypothesis is now thata1 =fl1 = 0:the
left-hand-side variable is purely random.
Most tests of equation (2) have rejected the null hypothesis, findingfitobe
significantly less than one. The range of point estimates has been wide, from
about -2.8 to 0.8. Coefficients that are positive, but less thanone, imply that
the optimal predictor of the spot rate puts positive weight on both the forward
rate and the contemporaneous spot rate. A coefficient of zero is the random
walk hypothesis: the forward discount is of no help in forecasting futurespot
rate changes.13 Least appealing, but nevertheless not unusual,are findings of
' Findings of this kind are not limited to investigations offoreign exchange markets. In
their study of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure, for example, Shiller,
Campbell and Schoertholts (1983) conclude that changes in the premium paid on longer-
term bills over short-term bills are useless for predicting future changes in short-term in-
terest rates,- 12-
significantnegative coefficients, which indicate that the spot rate tends to move
in the direction opposite to that predicted by the forward discount.
As in the previous section, tests of equation (2) are joint tests of rational
expectations and no exchange risk premiuim Without other information, how-
ever, researchers have been forced to focus on one alternative hypothesis at
the expense of the other. For example, one could ignore the risk premium and
interpret the forward rate as representing investors' expectations. In this con-
text, Bilson (1981b) proposed that the alternative ofless than one be termed
"excessive speculation", because it would imply that investors could do better
on average if they were to reduce fractionally their forecasts of exchange rate
changes, and that the alternative of f?greaterthan one be termed "insufficient
speculation", because it would imply that investors could do better if they were
to raise multiplicatively the magnitude of their forecasts of exchange rate
changes.
The most popular alternative hypothesis in regressions of equations like
(2), however, is that domestic and foreign securities are imperfect substitutes
because of risk. As we have already mentioned, Fama (1984), Hodrick and
Srivastava (1985) and Bilson (1985) argue that coefficients close to zero in such
regressions can be viewed as evidence of a risk premium that, is more variable
than are expectations. By taking probability limits, the slope coefficientin




var(ts÷k) +cov(ts÷k,rp) ________—— —- (3)
var(ts÷k) +2cov(s+k,rp7)+var(rp)
where the second equality follows from assuming rational expectations. If <- 13-
asis usually found, it follows that var(rp) > var(Es÷k).Accordingly, Bilson
(1985 p. 63) interprets the accumulated results of suchregressions as evidence
that "most of the variation in the [forward] premium reflects variationin the
risk premium rather than variation in the expected rate ofappreciation."
Indeed, the growing body of evidence thatis insignificantly different from zero
does not permit one to reject the extreme view thatexpectations are totally
unrelated to the forward rate, in other words, that all variation in theforward
discount is attributable solely to variation in the riskpremium.
3.1. Econometric Issues
Before turning to our own estimates of equation (2).we pause briefly to
mention several important econometric issues.
Estimation of equation (2) (and most of the equationswe estimate later), is
performed using OLS. We stack different countries, and in some cases different
forecast horizons, into a single equation. The complicated correlationpattern
of the residuals, however, renders the OLS standarderrors incorrect in finite
samples. Several types of correlation are present.
First, there is serial correlation induced by asampling interval shorter
than the corresponding forecast horizon (up toeight times). This is the usual
case in which overlapping ob .vations imply that, under the nullhypothesis,
the error term is a moving average process of an orderequal to the frequency
of sampling interval divided by the frequency of thehorizon, minus one. Han-
sen and Hodrick (1980) propose using a method of moments (MoM)estimator
for the standard errors in precisely the application studiedhere.
Second, in order to take advantage of the fact that thesurveys covered
four or five currencies simultaneously, we pooled theregressions across coun-
tries. This type of pooling induces contemporaneouscorrelation in the residu-- 14-
als.14Normally. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions should be used to exploit this
correlation efficiently. We use SUR later; here, however, the serial correlation
induced by overlapping observations makes SUR inconsistent.
The basic model may be written as:
k k k =t-k .P +v (4)
where k is the number of periods in the forecast horizon and i indexes the
currency. We account for the two types of correlation in the residuals with a
MoM estimate of the covariance matrix of :
= (4')
whereis the matrix of regressors of size N (countries) times T (time). The






where r is the order of the MA process, is the OLS residual, and k = li—i
Insome cases, this unrestricted estimate of C) uses well over 100 degrees of








= EE w(t+It, t—k+pT) if and
N(N—1)p=Oi=O
14Eachcurrency in our pooled regressions was given its own constant term. This model-
3flg sta-ategy seemed most reasonable in view of the dilTerences across currencies in the
magnitudes of both ex post spot rate changes and the forward discount (see Table 1).
15Thenumber of independent parameters in the covariance matrix does not affect the
asymptotic covariance, as long as these rarameters are estimated consistently (see Hansen- 15-
=0otherwise (6)
These restrictions have the effect of averaging the own-currency and cross-
currency autocorrelation functions of the OLS residuals, respectively, bringing
the number of independent covariance parameters down to 2r.
Tests of forward discount unbiasedness also provide an opportunity to
aggregate across different forecast horizons (though we are unaware of anyone
who has done this, even with the standard forward discount data), adding a
third pattern of correlation in the residuals. Such stacking seems appropriate
in this case because we wish to study the predictive power of the forward
discount generally, rather than at any particular time horizon. Moreover, a
MoM estimator which incorporates several forecast horizons has appeal beyond
the particular application studied here because it is computationally simpler
than competing techniques and at the same time can be more efficient than sin-
gle k-step-ahead forecasting equations estimated with MoM.
To demonstrate the precise nature of the correlation induced by such
aggregation, consider the stochastic process, ,whichis stationary and
ergodic in first differences and has finite second moments. We denote the k
period change in y from period f—k to t as y, and the h period change as
n-i
= where h = nk for any positive integer n16 We then define the
=0
innovations,v andas:
kk k v=Y —E(yj (7)
(1982)). Nevertheless, one suspects that the small-sample properties of the MoM estimator
worsen as the number of nuisance parameters to be estimated increases,
16Thefollowing example can easily be generalized to allow h and k to be any positive
integers. It is also possible to combine iii a similar fashion more than two diflerent forecast
horizons. Indeed, we combine three horizons in the Economist data estimates in the regres-
sions below. Because these extensions yield no additional insights and come at the cost of
more complicated algebra, however, we retain the simple example above.- 16-
hh
= Yg—E(y pt—h)
whereincludes present and lagged values of the vector ofright-hand-side
variables, z. These facts allow us to write the covariance matrix of the innova-
tions as:
k k v 11k h
E =F[v'v'] =[ ,h (6)
where the (i,j)th element of each submtrix of E is equal to thecorresponding
autocovariance function, evaluated at q =i—





=E(v14'q) =if—h <q <0
=0otherwise
In this context consider the aggregated model:
y=xtP4-Vt (ii)
where Yg' [y÷ Y+h'1' z' [zr'x]and [v' V7+h'J. The OLS estimate
of then has the usual MoM estimate of the sample covariance matrix:
—1 —1 a = (x2NTx2NT) xEx(xx)
where is a consistent estimate of E, and is formed by using the OLS residuals
to estimate the autocovariance and crosscovariance functions inequations (9)
and (10).
One might think that by stacking forecast horizons, as we do inequation
(ii), greater asymptotic efficiency always results than if only the shorter-term- 17-
forecastsare used, in other words, that —2 ispositive semidefinite. After
all, the sample size has doubled, and the only additional estimates we require
are nuisance parameters of the covariance matrix. This intuition would be
correct for asymptotically efficient estimation strategies, such as maximum
likelihood. But because OLS weights each observation equally, the MoM covari-
ance estimates reflect the average precision of the data. it follows that if the
longer-term forecasts are sufficiently imprecise relative to the shorter-term
forecasts, the precision of the estimate of fidrops:we could actually j
efficiency by adding more data. In the appendix we demonstrate this potential
loss in asymptotic efficiency, and show how it is related to the disparity in fore-
cast horizons. Efficiency is most likely to increase if the longer-term forecast
horizon is a relatively small multiple of the shorter-term horizon, indeed, in the
forthcoming regressions we find a marked increase in precision from stacking
across forecast horizons when r = 2 (in the Economist and Amex samples), but
little or no increase in precision when r = 4 or 6 (in the MMS samples).
Finally, the above MoM estimates of the covariance matrix need not be
positive definite in small samples. Newey and West (1985) offer a corrected esti-
mate of the covariance matrix that discounts the jth order autocovariance by
1 —(ji(,n+1)),making the covariance matrix positive definite in finite sample.
Nevertheless, for any given sample size, there remains the question of how small
inmustbe to guarantee positive definiteness. In the upcoming regressions we
tried in = r (which Newey and West themselves suggest) and in =2r;we report
standard errors using the latter value of in because they were consistently
larger than those using the former.17
17Forthe two aggregated MMS data sets in Table 8 below, a value of in = r was used
after finding that in =2rresulted in a nonpositive semi-definite covariance matrix This
correction reduced the standard errors in these two regressions by an average of only 3
percent.- 18-
32. Results
Table 4 presents the standard forward discount unbiasednessregressions
(equation (2)) for our sample periods.18 Most of the coefficients fall into the
range reported by previous studies. Note that in the Economist and Amex data
sets, in which forecasts horizons were stacked, the standard errors fell in the
aggregated regressions by 14 and 31 percent, respectively, in comparison with
regressions that used the shorter-term predictions alone. In terms of the point
estimates, all but one of the data sets indicate that the optimal predictor of the
future spot rate places negative weight on the forward rate, and more than half
of the coefficients are significantly less than zero. There is ample evidence to
reject unbiasedness. In the two MMS data sets, which cover shorter sample
periods of 14 and 21 months, respectively, the coefficients have unusually large
absolute values, lending support to the observation by Gregory and McCurdy
(1984) that the regression relation in equation (2) may be unstable. The F-tests
also indicate that the unbiasedness hypothesis fails in most of the data sets.
At this point, we could interpret the results as reflecting systematicpred-
iction errors. Under this interpretation, it follows that agents would do better
by placing more weight on the contemporaneous spot rate and less weight on
other factors in forming predictions of the future spot rate, the view discussed
by Bilson (1981b). On the other hand, we could interpret the results as evi-
dence of a time-varying risk premium. Then the conclusions would be that
changes in expected depreciation are not correlated (or are negatively corre-
lated) with changes in the forward discount and, from equation (3), that the
variance of the risk premium is greater than the variance of expected deprecia-
tion.
Regressions were estimated with dummies for each country, which we do not report to
save space. For the regressions which pool over different forecast horizons (marked
Economist Data and Amex Data), each country was allowed its own constant term forevery forecast horizon.TABLE 4
TESTSOF FORWARD DISCOuNT UNBIASEDNESS
IlLSRegressions of ésIt+I) on fd(t)
Ftes$
DataSet Dates It:Isot:S'iIl OFtsO,Bui frob)F
Econosist Data 6181—1218.5 —0.5684—0.56 —1.54 0.16 509 2.12 0.007
(1.0171)
Econ3Month 6/81—12185 -1.2090-1.04 -1.91S 0.01 184 1.29 0.262
(1.1596)
Econ 6 Month 6181—12185 —1.9819 —1.37 —2.06 5* 0.07 174 1.47 0.191
(1.4445)
Econ 12 Month 6/81—12185 0.2892 0.23 —0.56 0.29 149 3.23 0.005
(1.2733)
WAS 1 Month 10/84—2186 —14.5529—2.43 *5—2.595* 0.21 171 2.67 0.024
16.0000)
WAS3Month 1183-10/84 —6.2540—2.91*5* —3.37*1* 0.50 183 12.01 0.000
(2.1508)
AMEXData 1/76—7/85 —2.2107 —2.30 *5—3.34*1* 0.23 86 2.60 0.007
(0.9623)
AMEX 6 Month 1/76—7/85 —2.4181 —1.92 * —2.71 *5* 0.26 45 2.42 0.041
(1.2608)
AMEX12 Month 1/76—7185 —2.1377—2.03 5* —2.97*5* 0.21 40 1.66 0.157
(1.0549)
Notes:Method of Moeents standard errors are in parentheses. $ Represents significance at the
102 level, 5$ and *1* represent significance at the 52 andIXlevels, respectively.- 19-
3.3.Decomposition ot the Forward Discount Bias Coefficient
The survey data, however, let us go a step further with the results of Table
4: we can now allocate part of the deviation from the null hypothesis of =1to
each of the alternatives: failure of rationality and thepresence of a risk prem-
ium. Using the fact that the (log) forward discount can be written as the sum of
expected depreciation plus the risk premiurn,
ft e ft fd = +rpg (12)
we can decompose the probability limit of the coefficient in equation (2) into:
ft ft ft
cov(rlg÷k,fdt) + COV(fSft,fdg) 9= (13) ft
var(fd)
where is the expectational prediction error defined in equation (1). With a
little algebra, can then be written as equal to 1 (the null hypothesis) minus a
term arising from any failure of rational expectations, minus another term aris-







var(rp) ÷ cov(Lsft. i-p)
ft
var(fd)
With the help of the survey data, both terms are observable. By inspection,
=0if there are no systematic prediction errors in the sample, and=0if
there is no risk premium (or, somewhat more weakly, if the risk premium is
uncorrelated with the forward discount).- 20-
Theresults of the decomposition are reported in Table 5a. First, ,8, is very
large in size when compared to ,,oftenby more than an order of magnitude.
In all of the regressions, the lion's share of the deviation from the null
hypothesis consists of systematic expectational errors. For example, in the
Economist data, our largest survey sample with 525 observations,=1.49and
=0.08.Second, whileis greater than zero in all cases,is sometimes
negative, implying in equation (14) that the effect of the survey risk premium is
to push the estimate of the standard coefficient in the direction above one. In
these cases, the risk premia do not explain a positive share of the forward
discount's bias. The positive values for ,onthe other hand, suggest the pos-
sibility that investors tended to overreact to other information, in the sense
that respondents might have improved their forecasting by placing more weight
on the contemporaneous spot rate and less weight on the forward rate. Third,
to the extent that the surveys are from different sources and cover different
periods of time, they provide independent information, rendering their agree-
ment on the relative importance and sign of the expectational errors all the
more forceful. To check if the level of aggregation in Table 5a is hiding impor-
tant diversity across currencies, Table Sb reports the decomposition for each
currency in every data set. Here the results are the same: expectational errors
are consistently large and pusitive, and the risk premium appears to explain no
positive portion of the bias.
While the qualitative results above are of interest, we would like to know
whether they are statistically significant, whether we can formally reject the
two obvious polar hypotheses: a) that the results in Table 4 are attributable
entirely to expectational errors; and b) that they are attributable entirely to
the presence of the risk premium in the survey data. We test these hypotheses
in turn in the following sections.TABLE Se
COIPSIENTSOF TIE FAILURE OF THEUIIBIASEDNESS HYPOTHESIS
INREGRESSIONSOFASItt1)ON FD(t)
Failureof Existence of Isplied




DataSet Bates N 8,
B
Econoalst Data 6/81-12185 525 1.49 0.08 -0.57
Econ 3 Month 6/81—12/85 190 2.51 -0.30 —1.21
Econ 6Month 6181—12/85 180 2.99 0.00 —1.98
Econ12 Month 6/81—12/85 155 0.52 0.19 0.29
IllSI Month 10184—2186 176 15.39 0.16 —14.55
III3Month 1183—10/84 188 6.07 1.18 —6.25
AMEXData 1176-7185 97 3.25 -0.03 —2.21
AlEX6 Month 1/76—7185 51 3.63 -0.fl —2.42
AlEX12Month 1/76—7184 46 3.11 0.03 —2.14TABLE Sb
COMPONENTS OF TIE FAILIME OF THE UNBIASEDNESS HYPOTHESIS
IN REGRESSIONS OFAS(t+1) ON FD(t)
Failureof Existence of I.plied









WON 3 MONTH 6/81-1 2/85 190 2.51 —0.30 —1.21 It 38 7.31 —1.11 —5.20
FR 38 —1.75 0.47 2.28 II 38 7.69 —1.64 -5.05
SN 38 5.03 —0.63 —3.40
IA 38 4.66 —0.73 —2.93
WON6MONTH 6(81-12/85 180 2.99 0.00 -1.98
UK 36 7.04 —0.17 —5.87
FR 36 —1.31 0.21 2.10
VS 36 10.16 -0.38 —8.77
50 36 5.75 -0.01 -4.74
IA 36 4.69 -0.18 —3.51
WON 12 MONTH 6/81-12/85 155 0.52 0.19 0.29
UK 31 1.87 0.93 —1.79
FR 31 —1.45 0.16 2.29
MO 31 —0.13 0.16 0.96
SN 31 0.96 0.25 —0.21
IA 31 3.09 —0.04 -2.05
MIS 1 MONTH 10/84—2/86 176 15.39 0.16 -14.55
UK 44 21.23 0.06 -20.28
US 44 10.34 -8.95 -0.39
58 44 13.15 —2.89 —9.26
IA 44 4.58 7.10 -10.68
MIS3 MONTH 1(83—10/84 188 6.07 1.18 6.25
UK 47 7.90 0.27 —7.16
MO 47 4.96 2.52 —6.48
SN 47 7.90 0.09 —6.90
IA 47 3.43 2.14 —4.57
AMEX6MONTH 1/76—7/85 51 3.63 —0.22 —2.42
UK 12 2.76 —0.15 —1.60
FR 9 1.09 —0.03 —0.06
US 12 4.78 —0.63 —3.15
SN 9 5.53 -0.33 —4.20
IA 9 4.58 —0.10 —3.48
NIX 12 MONTH 1(76—7/84 46 3.11 0.03 2.14
UK 11 2.53 —0.09 —1.45
FR 8 0.48 0.32
VS 11 3.53 —0.40 —2.13
SW 8 3.99 0.38 —3.37
IA 8 5.36 0.12 —4.49- 21-
4.A Direct Test of Perfect Substitutability
We consider first a test of whether the bias introduced by the risk prem-
ium. p,,.isstatistically significant. The most direct test is a regression of the
survey expected depreciation against the forward discount:
= a2 + 2fd + e2g (17)
where the null hypothesis is that no risk premium separates the two,a2 = 0 and
= 1. Strictly speaking, the expected future spot rate exactly equals the for-
ward rate if assets are perfect substitutes, so that we should interpret the
regression error as measurement error in the surveys.Thus,
= iS+2t' where t+k is the unobservable "true" market expected
change in the spot rate. Note that if the null hypothesis holds, we can use the
R2 from equation (17) to obtain an estimate of the relative importance of the
measurement error component in the survey data.19
To see that a test of= 1 is equivalent to a test of= 0, note that the





k. where rp is the survey risk premium less any measurement error, i.e., the
"true" market risk premium, fd — Equation(17) may also be used to test
formally the Fama (1984) hypothesis regarding the size of the variance of
expected depreciation relative to the variance of the risk premium. A little
algebra yields:'Notealso that in a test of equation (17) using the survey data, the properties of the
error term, 2 will be invariant to any "peso problems," which affect instead the ex post




P2 = i———— +. (19)
var(fd)
Equation (19) says that if p2issignificantly greater than ,thevariance of
expected depreciation exceeds that of the risk prerriium. The qualitative
finding in Table 3, column (6). that the variance of expected depreciation is the
greater can thus be tested formally. Although measurement error in the survey
data would tend to overstate both of these variances, it does not affect the esti-
mate of their difference (equation (19)). This point is evident from equation
(17), in which the measurement error e2 is conditionally independent of the
estimate ofas long as it is random, i.e., E(2g fd) =0.
Under mild assumptions, equation (17) may also be interpreted as a direct
test of uncovered interest parity. If we rule out the presence of riskiess arbi-
trage opportunities, then by covered interest parity the forward discount
exactly equals the excess return paid on domestic securities relative to foreign
securities:
.k.k k — ?'' = fd
whereandare the domestic and foreign interest rates on instruments
which mature in k periods. Uncovered interest parity is thus the hypothesis
that the interest differentialequivalent to investors' expectations of future
depreciation.20
4.1.Results
Table 6 reports the OLS regressions of equation (17). In some respects the
data provide evidence in favor of perfect substitutability. All of the estimates of
are statistically indistinguishable from one (with the sole exception of the
°Fortestsofuncovered interest parity similar to the tests of conditional bias in the
forward discount that we considered in section 3, see Cumby and Obstfeld (1981).TULE 6
TESTS SF PWEC1 SUSSTITIJTUILITY
01.5Regrnuions if Es(t+1)] onfd(t)
F test
lutaSet Pates Its1.5tilel R IF IN asO,11 Prob)F
Ecouoeist Pita 6181—12185 0.98803.33 $14 4.08 0.89 554 1.44 28.610.000
(0.1465)
ka3 Mouth 6181—12185 1.3037 3.14 *1*1.19 0.10 184 1.56 16.55 0.000
(0.2557)
Ecou 6 Mouth 6/81—12185 1.03263.14 4*1 0.19 0.89 184 1.37 52.060.000
(0.1694)
Econ 12 Mouth 6/81—12185 0.92862.86 *1* 4.48 0.91 184 1.44 65.820.000
(0.1499)
MM8 I Month 10/84—2/86 0.1416 0.20 —0.09 0.21 171 1.02 6.790.000
(1.fl75)
853 Month 1/83—10/84 4. 1816—1.59 —2.75 1*10.73 182 1.50 14.600.000
(0.4293)
ME! Pita 1/76—7185 0.96051.85 *4.16 0.64 91 0.74 5.380.000
(0.2495)
ME! 6 Mouth 1/76—7/85 1.2165 3.4414$1.04 0.71 45 1.45 6.320.000
(0.2085)
AlE! 12 Mouth 1/76—7/85 0.87701.37 4.45 0.61 45 0.51 8.100.000
(0.2755)
Motes:Method of Mouents staudurd errors are in parentheses. I Represents siguificance at the
102level,$1and *1* representsignificance at the 52aid12 levels, respectively.- 23-
MMSthree-month sample). In the Economist and Amex data sets whichaggre-
gate across time horizons, the estimates are 0.99 and 0.96, respectively.21
Expectations seem to move very strongly with the forward rate. With theexcep-
tion of the MMS data, the coefficients are estimated withsurprising precision.
As we might expect, however, the large magnitudes of the riskpremia discussed
in section 2 cause us to reject perfect substitutability. Each of the F-tests
reported in Table 6 rejects the parity relation at a level of significance that is
less than 0.1 percent.
In terms of our decomposition of the forward discount biascoefficient,
Table 6 shows the values of j9,., in column 2 of Table 5a are notsignificantly
different from zero. Thus the rejection of unbiasedness found in theprevious
section cannot be explained entirely by the risk premium atany reasonable
level of confidence. Indeed, in spite of the fact that thesurvey risk premium
has substantial magnitude (Table 2), we cannot reject thehypothesis that the
risk premium explains no positive portion of the bias.
Table 6 also reports a t-test of the hypothesis that=}. Insix out of
nine cases the data strongly reject the hypothesis that the variance of thetrue
risk premium is greater than or equal to that of trueexpected depreciation; we
have rather var(ACk) > var(). In addition, equation (16) and thefinding
that = 1 together imply that:
Th
var(rp)+ cov(Asrp) =0
Thus we cannot reject the hypothesis that the covariance of trueexpected
depreciation and the true risk premium is negative (as Fama found), norcan we
21Forthe Economist six-month and twelve-month and the Amex twelve-month datasets, the estimates of ft2fromequation (1?) do not exactly correspond to 1 —ftinTables ba
and 5b, This is because Table 6 includes a few survey observations for whicffactualfuture
spot rates have not yet been realized, whereas these observations were left out of the
decomposition in Tables 5a and 5b for purposes of comparability. If we had used the small-
er samples in Table 6, the regression coefficients would have been .92 and 1,03, for the
Economist and Amex data sets, respectively.- 24-
rejectthe extreme hypothesis that the variance of the true risk premium is
zero.
2,- Notethat the R s in Table 6 are relatively high. Under the null hypothesis
that true expected depreciation exactly equals the forward discount, one could
interpret these results as evidence that the measurement-error component of
the survey data is relatively small. For example, under this interpretation of
thestatistics, measurement error accounts for about 10 percent of the vari-
ability in expected depreciation from the Economist survey.22 The presence of a
time-varying risk premium uncorrelated with the forward discount, however.
implies that the disturbance term, will riot be purely measurement error
but will also include variation of the risk premium around its mean. In this case
a second interpretation of the R2 measure is possible: that it overstates the
measurement error component of the surveys. Indeed, the low values of the
Durbin-Watson statistics reported in Table 6 seem to suggest the presence in
the OLS residuals of a risk premium which is serially correlated but uncorre-
lated with the forward discount.
In Table 7 we correct for the potential serial correlation problem by
employing a Three-Stage-Least-Squares estimator that allows for contem-
poraneous correlation (SUR) as well as first order auto-regressive distur-
bances.23 3SLS is consistent here because there are no overlapping observa-
tions --predictionsby the forward rate and the surveys are observed contem-
poraneously --andit has the advantage of being asymptotically efficient. The
results reported in Table 7 show that this correction does not change the
nature of the results; all but one of the coefficients remain close to one, and
Recall, however, that the Ff2 measures in Table 6 include the explanatory power of the
constant terms for each currency and forecast horizon.
Unfortunately, the highlyirregularspacing of the Amex data sets did not permit an
auto-regressive correction in this case.TABLE 7
TESTS OF PERFECT SUBSTITUTABILITY
3518 Reqressions of ErsIt+1)] on +d(t}
average Prob > F
Data Set Dates B t B.5 t: 8:1 p(l> OF a:0, 8:1
Economist 3 Month 6/81—12/85 0.8723 2.81 U$ -0.96 0.13 184 0.000
tO.1327)
Economist 6 Month 6181—12/85 0.8768 4.83 UI —1.58 0.32 184 0.000
(0.0780)
Economist 12 Month 6/81—12/85 0.8378 4.26 $11—2.041$ 0.27 184 0.000
(0.0793)
MMS I Month 10164—2/86 —1.1535-1.58 -2.06II 0.21 171 NA
U. 0445)
MMS 3 Month 1/83-10/84 0.4672—0.10 —1.59 0.33 179 0.000
(0.3354)
(1) Average p is the meanacrosscountries of the first order auto—regressive coefficients.
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are jr parentheses. * Represents significance at the
lOX level, *1 and *1* represent significance at the 57. and 17. levels, respectively.- 25-
thereis clear evidence that the variance of expected depreciation is greater
than that of the risk premium (while there is no evidence for the alternative
that the variance of the risk premium is greater).
5. Tests of Rational Expectations
In this section we test to see whether the interpretation of the standard
bias findings in section 3 as evidence of systematic prediction errors can be
supported. While in section 2 we found evidence that investors err in their
unconditional forecasts of future changes in the spot rate, here we focus
instead on whether investors tend to place too little weight on the contem-
poraneous spot rate and too much on all other information. Tests of rational
expectations which address this question typically regress future prediction
errors of the forward discount on subsets of the contemporaneous information
set. As we have already noted, these tests are only valid in the absence of a risk
premium.. Consequently, we use here the prediction errors of the survey data
instead.
5.1. A Test of Excessive Speculation
Perhaps the most powerful test of rational expectations is one which asks
whether investors would do better if they placed more or less weight on the
contemporaneous spot rate as opposed to .flothervariables in their informa-
tion set.24 This test is performed by a regression of the expectational prediction
error on expected depreciation:
— = a + + Vt+k (20)
where the null hypothesis is a = 0 and d = 0.25 This is the equation that Bilson
Frankel and Froot (1986) test whether the survey expectations place too little weight
on the contemporaneous spot rate and too much weight on specific pieces of information
such as the lagged spot rate, the long-run equilibrium exchange rate, and the lagged ex-
pected spot rate.
To see how the alternative in equation (20)is too much or too little weight on all vari-
ables in the information set other than the contemporaneous spot rate, assume expecta-- 26-
(1961b)and others had in mind, which we already termed a test of "excessive'
speculation, with the dierence that we are measuring expected depreciation
by the survey data instead of by the ambiguous forward discount.
Our tests are reported in Table 8. The findings consistently indicate that
ci > 0, so that investors could on average do better by giving more weight to the
contemporaneous spot rate and less weight to other information they deem
pertinent. In other words, the excessive speculation hypothesis is upheld. F-
tests of the hypothesis that there are no systematic expectational errors,
a =ci=0,reject at the one percent level for all of the survey data sets.
The results in Table 8 would appear to constitute a resounding rejection of
rationality in the survey expectations. Up until this point, our test statistics
have been robust to the presence of random measurement error in thesurvey
data. But now, under the null hypothesis, measurement error biases toward
one our estimate of d in equation (20). The test of d =0,therefore, may reject
more easily than the usual probability values would imply. To demonstrate this
efTect, suppose that expected depreciation as recorded by the survey is equal
to the market's true expectation, plus an error term:
= S1÷k + (21)
where is iid and E(E st°k) =0.The actual spot rate change can then be
expressed as the sum of the true market expectation plus a prediction error:
tions are formed as a linear combination of the current spot rate, S,andany linear coinbi-
nation of variables in the information set, l:
= + (i—ii-1)s
If the actual process is:
=112; +(1—ir2)s —v+k
Then equation (20) can be rewritten as
LSg÷
— = a +(ira —1r2)(It
—s) +'t+k (20')
Rational expectations is the case in which the coefficient 7T— 112is zero, A positive value
implies 71 > 712: investors put insufficient weight on Sandtoo much weight on other in-
formation.TABLE 8
TESTS OF EXCESSIVE SPECULATION
Regressions of E(s(t+1)]—s(t+1) an EE4s(t+1)]
F test Prob > F
Data Set Dates B t: 8:0 t: B1 R DF OW a:0, 9:0
Economist Data 6181—12185 1.01622.48 U 0.04 0.49 509 4.79 0.000
(0.4104)
Econ 3 Month 6/81-12/85 1.6141 3.46 *1* 1.32 0.26 184 2.91 0.010
(0.4664)
Econ 6 Month 6/81-12/85 2.5325 3.75 *1*2.27 ** 0.41 174 3.54 0.002
(0.6746)
Econ 12 Month 6/81—12/85 —0.3005—0.57 —2.48 U 0.67 149 6.32 0.000
(0.5241)
NMS 1 Week, I Month 10/84—2/86 1.2561 3.54 Ut 0.72 0.24 414 6.07 0.000
(0.3544)
MMS 1 Week 10/84—2/86 1.1476 3.90 *1*0.50 0.14 242 1.84 3.97 0.002
(0. 2939)
MMS I Week, S)JR 10/84—2/86 0.7858 7.09 III-1.93* 0.18 239 12.42 0.000
(0.1109)
NtIS 1 Month 10/84-2/86 1.3068 2.76 Itt0.65 0.28 171 3.11 0.010
(0. 4741)
NMS 2 Week, 3 Month 1/83-10/84 1.0494 3.32 11*0.16 0.59 365 7.87 0.000
(0. 3159)
NtIS 2 Week 1/83-10/84 1.05943.69 Ut 0.21 0.23 182 1.74 5.40 0.000
(0. 2870)
NtIS 2 Week, SUR 1/B3-10/84 1.0469 5.77 *5*0.26 0.16 179 9.42 0.000
(0.1913)
NtIS 3 Month 1/83—10/84 1.0465 2.69 *5*0.12 0.63 182 7.59 0.000
(0.3895)
AMEX Data 1/76—7/85 2.6082 5.09 Itt3.14*1* 0.23 86 4.71 0.000
(0.5123)
AMEX 6 Month 1/76—7/85 2.5693 3.49 Itt2.131* 0.37 45 4.22 0.002
(0.7358)
AMEX 12 Month 1/76—7/85 2.6382 4.54 11*2.82 5*1 0.50 40 4.24 0.002
(0. 5812)
Notes: All regressions except those marked SUR are estimated using 019, with Method of Moments standard errors (in
parentheses). SUR regressions report asymptotic standard errors. Durbin-Watson statistics are reported for data
sets in which the forecast horizon is equal to the sampling interval. I Represents significance at
the 1O level, U and III represent sigrificarice at the 5 and I 1eve1s respectively.- 27-
—C k t+k=t+k+11+k (22)
Using these facts, the coefficient d in equation (20) converges in probability to:
var(E) —
cov(?÷k,_t.I-k) ci =————————— —
(23)
var() + var(Ask)
Measurement error therefore biases our OLS estimates toward one. Indeed, in
the limiting case in which the measurement error accounts for all of the varia-
bility of expected depreciation in the survey --inother words, no information
at all about the "true" market expectation is contained in thesurveys --the
parameter estimate would be statistically indistinguishable from one. In Table
8, 13 of 15 estimates of ci are greater than one; in five cases the difference is
statistically significant. This result suggests that measurement error is not the
source of our rejection of rational expectations. However, we shall now see that
stronger evidence can be obtained.
5.2. Another Test of Excessive Speculation
One way to get around this added source of noise is to use the projection of
the survey expectations onto investors' information set as the right-hand-side
variable in equation (20). Thus we seek a proxy for thesurvey expectations.
The candidate must be highly correlated with thesurvey expected depreciation,
and conditionally independent of the measurement error, E(E Jfd) =0.In
view of the results from section 4, the forward discount seemseminently
qualified. The usual instrumental variables estimation procedure is not neces-
sary in this case because the null hypothesis is that d 0. Thus we run the OLS
regression:
—
Sg+ka1 + + 1.t+k (24)
and perform a test of rationality,a1 =0.TABLE 9
TESTS OF RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
OLS Regressions of EEs(t+1)]—s(t+l} on fd(t)
F test
Data Set Dates B t: B=O R OFa:0, 8=0Prob > F
Econoiist Data 6/81—12/85 1.4903 1.41 0.48 509 4.75 0.000
(1.0580)
Econ 3 Month 6/81—12/85 2.5127 1.95 0.14 184 1.31 0.256
(1.2918)
Econ 6 Month 6/81-12/85 2.9866 1.87 * 0.28 174 1.46 0.194
(1.5974)
Ecan 12 Month 6/81—12/85 0.5174 0.42 0.67 149 6.01 0.000
(1.2290)
NNS I Month 10/84—2186 15.3945 2.42 *1 0.20 171 2.54 0.030
(6. 3520)
MNS 3 Month 1/83-10/84 6.0725 2.60 It 0.66 182 11.93 0.000
(2.3392)
AMEX Data 1/76-7/85 3.2452 2.78 Itt0.33 86 2.69 0.005
(1.1675)
AMEX 6 Month 1/76-7/85 3.6346 2.70 1*10.26 45 3.30 0.009
(1.3437)
AMEX 12 Month 1/76—7/85 3.1081 2.40 It 0.25 40 1.48 0.210
(1.2954)
Notes: Method of Moments standard errors are in parentheses. I Represents significance at the
10 level, *1 and *1* represent significance at the 57.and1 levels, respectively.- 28-
Equation(24) has additional relevance in the context of our decomposition
of the forward rate unbiasedness regression in section 3: the coefficient,fi1,is
precisely equal to the deviation from unbiasedness due to systematic prediction
errors, fi,..Thusequation (24) can tell us whether the large positive values of
fi,.foundin column (1), Tables 5a and 5b are statistically significant.
Table 9 reports OLS regressions of equation (24). We now see that thepoint
estimates of fi,.inTables 5a and 5b are measured with precision. The data con-
tinue to reject statistically the hypothesis of rationalexpectations,
a1 =0,fi1= 0.They reject fi1= 0,in favor of the alternative of excessive specu-
lation. (Because the measurement error has been purged, the levels of
significance are necessarily lower than those of Table 8.) Thus the result that
is significantly greater than zero seems robust across different forecast
horizons and different survey samples. In terms of thedecomposition of the
typical forward rate unbiasedness test in Table 5a, we can now reject the
hypothesis that all of the bias is attributable to the survey risk premium. Put
differently, even after allowing for measurement error, it is still not possible to
reject the hypothesis that all the bias consists of repeated expectationalerrors
made by survey respondents, and that no positive portion of the biascan attri-
buted to the survey risk premium.- 29-
6.CONCLUSIONS
(1) The survey data indicate that forward rate prediction errors do not give
insight into the nature of the risk premia as commonly thought. In all three
surveys, the errors exhibit unconditional bias of a sign opposite to estimates of
the risk premium from the survey data. The prernia are large in absolute value,
and are statistically different from zero. We can reject the hypothesis thatsys-
tematic unconditional mistakes made by the forward rate in predicting the
future spot rate are due entirely to a failure of rational expectations. But at
the other extreme, the hypothesis that the forward rate prediction errors can
be explained by the risk premium alone is also rejected.
(2) Expected depreciation is more variable than both the forward discount and
the risk premium. The first finding corroborates Fama's (1984) conjecture that
expected depreciation and the risk premium are negatively correlated. The
second finding rejects the hypothesis that the variance of expected deprecia-
tion is less than the variance of the risk premium, let alone the more extreme
random-walk hypothesis that the variance of expected depreciation is zero.
(3) Direct tests of perfect substitutability across assets denominated in
different currencies produce mixed results. We find evidence against a time-
varying risk premium, in the respect that changes in expected depreciation are
on average matched, one for one, with changes in the forward discount. In
terms of point (2). changes in the forward discount appear to be unrelated to
changes in risk. The hypothesis of no risk premium fails in our regressions.
however, because the level of expected depreciation is significantly different
from the forward discount by a constant term. In short, while the survey data
do support the existence of a substantial risk premium, they suggest that the
many previous citations of forward discount bias as evidence for the exchange- 30-
riskpremium may have been misplaced.
(4) While changes in the forward discount reflect changes inexpected deprecia-
tion, they seem to be, if anything, negatively related to futurespot rate
changes. Significantly negative coefficients in regression tests of forward
discount unbiasedness, a common finding inmany previous tests, are also found
here. The survey data indicate that this large andsignificant deviation from
unbiasedness is overwhelmingly due to repeated forecasting mistakesmade by
survey respondents. As in the unconditional case in point (1), we are unable to
reject the hypothesis that the conditional deviation from unbiasedness isdue
entirely to a failure of rational expectations. We ableto reject the compet-
ing hypothesis that the deviation from unbiasedness ispurely a consequence of
the risk premium. The implication is that, whenforming their expectations,
investors would do better to put more weight on thecontemporaneous spot
rate, and less weight on all other variables on which theyrely. This is the same
result that Bilson and many others have found with forwardmarket data; but
now it cannot be attributed to a risk premium.- 31-
7. APPNDTX
Inthis appendix we show how the asymptotic efficiency of the method-of-
moments estimator is affected by aggregating over forecast horizons. Consider
the model:
ft ft ft = + (Al)
where =— andthe error term is orthogonal to the present and past
values of z and y, E(÷ft ) = 0.Our example below
considers the simple case of a single regressor, x, but may easily be extended
to a vector of righthand-side variables. Define the lid innovations =
ft kk ftft ft kk ftft
E(y IXg ,x1,,y,y_1 .) and =E(zgtxg x •. . . ). If2
and y are jointly covariance stationary, then the Wold. decomposition implies
that:
ft'-' ft
Vg+ft=LiôVg+ft_i + 2j7?7gft_. + (A2)
a a
ft ft
E(vt÷kI) = + + D
i
whereis the deterministic component of y, andincludes past and present
values of x andy. We are primarily concerned with the case in whichis the
best unbiased forecast of Yg÷ftThatis, under the null hypothesis of forward
discount unbiasedness, is an efficient predictor of the future spot rate
change, S4ft. Thus we assume that zalreadycontains all relevant informa-
tion for forecasting Yg÷ft'sothat E(y÷ft E(yft lz).
Wedefineanalogouslythe h period change in as
,i-I h-jk-1




=E E âVg+h_j + E fh-Jk-i+ (AZ')
J=Oi=0 J=0%=0
n—i n—i
11 h E(yt+h I9) L1 ôjVt÷h_jk_+ l.jY;?+h—jk—i+
50%h—jk j=O;h—jk
These facts imply that the Jc and h period prediction errors, and
respectively, are stationary with finite second moments. If we assume that
= and = are stationary with finite variance, then
kk . hh ft E(qgqg) = 0 for ,ik, and E(q g÷) = 0 for j h. Thus qg can be expressed











= EE (—5k—+aft +h (A4)
5=0=0
n-2




xa(z)=Ex: =EE a5a28. (A5)
5i-kj=0
Usingequation (A4), the covariance generating function forcan be written
as:- 33-
n(n+1) n(n—l) xd()= Xc(z)+ XG(z) + + 2X0c1(z) (A5')
2 2
whereX'(z) is a complicated generating function of the as's and ci's which we
need not specify here. Finally, the covariance generating function, X'(z) =
h—ih—I
2'c-aL1L1 a5d,+5can be rewritten as:
•=1—k1=0
{n+l) (n—i) X(z) = X(z)+——+ (A6)
2 2
where X2(z) is another generating function of the as's and c1's.




k —1kk - where= T If we add in the longer-term forecast data, our model
is that of equation (11) above, with asymptotic covariance matrix:
=(x.+ x)2 (Xd(z)+Xa(Z) + 2X(z)) (A8)
By substitution, we have that &> ifand only if:
—1+—— (A9)
2 _____ ____ Xa(z)÷xc(z)+2(XacI(z)+xac2(z))_X:
>fl 3f1+ +n33+-+
X(z) XU(z)
Equation (A9) says that the variance of the longer-term data, X, must increase
at a rate the same as or greater than the relative forecasting interval, n, if we
are to gain by adding longer-term forecasts to data sets of only shorter-term
forecasts. Thus as the forecasting interval increases, we require correspond-- 34-
inglygreater variability of the regressors in order to compensate for the
greater variability of the forecast errors.
One might think that the result in equation (A9) isa consequence of
weighting the more imprecise longer-term predictions equally with thepredic-
tions of shorter-term. Perhaps if we downweighted thelonger-term data, we
would always gain in efficiency. It turns out that this is not thecase. In the
remaining space, we construct a consistent, optimally weighted estimator and
show that the efficiency of this estimatormay still worsen asymptotically by
adding in the longer-term forecasts.
In most circumstances, GLS represents theoptimal weighting strategy
when the data have different levels of precision. GLS is,however, inconsistent
when used on a model with overlapping observations. Thuswe consider instead
a weighted least squares estimator which is optimal within a class of consistent
estimators. Consider a transformation of the model inequation (ii), which
stacks the shorter- and longer-term data:
Wy =Wxfl+Wv1 (AlO)
where W is a diagonal matrix. The MoM estimate of inequation (Alo), ,will
be consistent for any arbitrary diagonal matrix W. Tosee this, note that the
MoM estimate of equation (Alo), Pmaybe written as:
Xr'WxXT I7(,— p) ——
(All)
27 —1 27
122 1 2 = — zi w1—
z1v
Thefinal term in equation (All)converges in probability to zero, provided that
the error term in equation (Alo) isconditionally independent of the contem-- 35-
poraneousvalue of the regressor, E(v x) =0(this is just the Gauss-Markov
assumption required for the consistency of OLS in estimating equation (AiD)).
Suppose now that we choose W optimally in order to maximize the gain in
efficiency from adding longer-term forecasts to our shorter-term data. That is:
max
(A12)
whereis the MoM asymptotic covariance matrix of
= (A13)
By normalizing the weight on every shorter-term data point to one, it is







Note thatwill always be positive if the data sets are uncorrelated, i.e. if
X(z) =0.In other words, appropriately weighted independent information
can always improve efficiency, no matter how imprecise the new information
may be. But, the nature of the correlation between contemporaneous longer-
term and shorter-term predictions implies that the optimal weight given to
longer-term data may be zero. In particular, Whwillbe zero if the numerator in
equation (A14) becomes negative. This occurs if n is too large in comparison
with the relative variance of the longer-term forecasts. Using equations (AS').




Thus, while the standard errors reported in the text indicate that for small
values of n one may obtain improvements in efficiency, this result is not likely- 36-
toapply MoM estimation of data with considerablylonger forecast horizons,
even when the data are downweighted to account for thegreater variance of
the longer-term forecast errors. It is worthstressing in closing that this poten-
tial loss in efficiency is a directconsequence of our limited information MoM
estimation strategy. Full information techniques,such as maximum likelihood
estimation, will consistently achieve nonzero gains inasymptotic efficiency with
the addition of longer-term data.- 37-
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